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Abstract
Using an oligopoly model of trade with asymmetric costs, we study the individual and
world welfare implications of a hub and spoke trade agreement where the hub country is more
e¢ cient than spoke countries. Under a hub and spoke trade regime, the hub country can
benet at the expense of the spokes relative to free trade. Furthermore, if the hub is su¢ ciently
e¢ cient compared to the spokes, such a regime can yield higher global welfare than free trade.
Preferential treatment of the e¢ cient hub country in its export markets improves world welfare
because it helps allocate a larger share of the worlds output to a low cost location.
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1 Introduction
One of the striking features of todays global policy landscape is the widespread prevalence of
preferential trade agreements (PTAs). As per the World Trade Organizations (WTO) o¢ cial web-
site, as of 2011, all but one of the WTO 153 members is a party to at least one PTA (Mongolia
is the exception), and on average each WTO member country belongs to 13 PTAs. We even
observe today that PTAs are in discussion with each other regarding mutual liberalization. While
the existing customs unions involve some of the major economies of the world, Free Trade Areas
(FTAs) constitute an overwhelming majority of PTAs, accounting for 83 percent of all PTAs.1 Since
FTA members individually impose optimal tari¤s on non-members, a member country of a bilateral
FTA is free to form an independent bilateral FTA with an existing non-member and create a hub
and spoke type trading regime.2 For example, Mexico, as a member of North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), has FTAs with the European Union (EU), European Free Trade Association
(EFTA), Chile, Israel, Japan, and many others. This di¤erence has important implications given
the fact that countries belong to several PTAs in todays world trading system. The goal of this
paper is to contribute to the literature by deriving the individual and world welfare implications of
hub and spoke regimes relative to global free trade under an oligopoly model of trade when costs
are asymmetric.3
We employ an n-country oligopoly model of trade under a reciprocal dumping framework of
Brander and Krugman (1983). Under the hub and spoke regime, there is one hub country and the
other countries are spokes. We assume that hub country has lower marginal cost of production
relative to symmetric spoke countries. We nd that the hub country benets so much from such
preferential liberalization that it is better o¤ relative to global free trade.4 This results stems from
two facts: (i) relative to free trade, export prots of the hub country increase in spoke countries
markets due to preferential treatment; (ii) due to market segmentation, the domestic surplus of
the hub country does not change relative to free trade since its own tari¤ equals zero under both
regimes. The ip side of this result is that the spoke countries are worse o¤ relative to global
free trade. This result formally validates the intuition that the hub can benet at the expense of
1 In the extensive literature on FTAs, welfare e¤ects of FTAs are generally discussed in the form of tari¤ comple-
mentarity e¤ects these agreements yield. See Bagwell and Staiger (1997, 1998), Yi (2000), and Ornelas (2005) for
further details. See Richardson (1995) on the incentives for member countries of FTAs to reduce their external tari¤s.
See Bhagwati et. al. (1999) and Kowalczyk (1999) for a collection of many important articles in the PTA literature.
2 If a PTA is a customs union, due to joint determination of external tari¤s, expansion can only take the form of
new membership. When the PTA is a free trade area, however, each member can negotiate individually with outside
countries. Using a network formation game, Furusawa and Konishi (2007) points out this important di¤erence in a
model of endogeneous formation of PTAs.
3Studies by Goyal and Joshi (2006), Furusawa and Konishi (2006), Mukunoki and Tachi (2006), and Saggi and
Yildiz (2010, 2011a, 2011b) examine PTAs as a network formation game.
4Similar result arises in Goyal and Joshi (2006) that endogenizes the FTA formation with exogenous tari¤s and
Mukonoki and Tachi (2006) in a setting of sequential negotiations of bilateral free trade agreements. Unlike the
present paper, both of these papers assume symmetry across countries
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the spokes. Kowalczyk and Wonnacott (1992) shows a similar result for economies under perfect
competition: a large country may prefer hub and spoke regime to global free trade. Kowalczyk
(2000) shows that a small country has incentives to seek access to many large country-free trade
areas thereby becoming a hub itself.5 We complement these results by using an oligopoly model of
trade with asymmetric costs.
Further analysis under cost asymmetry yields a remarkable result that has been overlooked
in the existing literature: hub and spoke trading arrangement can yield higher global welfare than
free trade. This result obtains when the hub country is su¢ ciently low cost relative to spoke
countries. Under such a scenario, preferential treatment of the hub country in its export markets
improves world welfare because it helps allocate a larger share of the worlds output to a low cost
location. In other words, the gains from allocative e¢ ciency may exceed the losses stemming from
the persisting tari¤s between spoke countries. Note that this result is closely linked to the Industrial
Organization literature: helping ine¢ cient rms may reduce social welfare (e.g., Lahiri and Ono,
1988).6 However, to the best of our knowledge, no previous papers have pointed out the role of a
hub and spoke trade system to enhance the allocative e¢ ciency.
The existing literature on the economic e¤ects of hub and spoke trade systems generally ap-
proach these agreements in a pessimistic way because of their discriminatory nature and less-
discriminatory PTAs, such as CUs, are argued to be more preferable (see Kowalczyk andWonnacott,
1992; Blackhurst and Henderson, 1993 and Krueger, 1997). Here, we argue that global reallocation
of production towards e¢ cient sources can reverse these arguments. In a similar framework as
ours, Mukunoki and Tachi (2006) studies sequential negotiations of bilateral free trade agreements
and examines the implications of hub and spoke agreements for the multilateral free trade. We
complement Mukonoki and Tachi (2006) and Kowalczyk and Wonnacott (1992) by examining the
scenario where countries are asymmetric with respect to production cost.
2 Model
We employ an oligopoly model of international trade where each country has a unilateral incentive
to impose rent extracting tari¤s (unless it commits not to do so via an FTA). There are n countries
and two goods: x and y. We assume that preferences over the two goods are quasilinear: U(x; y) =
u(x) + y. Good x is produced by a single rm in each country at a constant marginal cost (in
terms of the numeraire good y). Given our focus, we initially consider a hub and spoke trading
regime where country i is the hub country while the other n  1 countries are spokes that impose
external tari¤s on each other. Such a regime is denoted by hfihgi while global free trade is denoted
5Similarly, in Puga and Venables (1997), due to agglomeration e¤ects, the formation of a hub and spoke arrange-
ment benets the hub whereas it can hurt the spoke nations by making location in the hub more attractive to rms.
For further discussion see Wonnacott (1996).
6Collie (1993) and Lahiri and Ono (1997) apply the similar argument in an international trade context.
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by hfFgi. Let c > 0 denote spoke rmsmarginal cost of producing good x and marginal cost of
the hub countrys rm is normalized to zero: cz = c  ci = 0; where z 6= i. Using Most Favoured
Nation (MFN) Clause, each spoke country imposes a symmetric tari¤ on the other spoke countries.
We employ a two-stage game under the hub and spoke trade regime. In the rst stage, spoke
countries impose their optimal tari¤s. Then, taking the trade policy regime and the associated
tari¤s as given, rms compete in Cournot fashion.7
For simplicity in notation, while each spoke country has an n  1 dimensional tari¤ vector, we
write prot, domestic surplus and total welfare as a function of the tari¤ it imposes on the hub
country (zero tari¤) and the symmetric MFN tari¤ spoke countries impose on each other. It is
useful to clarify our notation with an example: in the export prot function jz(0, tz), the rst
argument is the tari¤ faced by the hub country i in spoke country zs market while the second
argument is the tari¤ faced by all other spoke exporters, where z 6= i and z 6= j. Moreover, at the
risk of slight abuse of notation, we will sometimes write prot, domestic surplus, and total welfare
as a function of the policy regime itself. For example, si(F ) denotes country is welfare under free
trade. Finally, let wi(ih)  wi(ih) wi(F ), i(ih)  i(ih) i(F ) and si(ih)  si(ih) si(F ).
3 Hub and Spoke Regime
Under the hub and spoke regime hfihgi, due to market segmentation, it is su¢ cient to focus on the
hub country and only one of the spoke countrys market (say country z). Let xjz denote country js
exports to country z where z 6= j; xzz the sales of rm z in country z; and xz = xzz+
X
j 6=z
xjz denote
total sales of good x in country z. While a spoke countrys (say country j) exports of good x to
another spoke country (say country z) are subject to a specic tari¤ tz per unit, the hub rm has
a free access.8 Let country zs tari¤ scalar be denoted by tz and the global tari¤ vector be denoted
by t. Then, the hub countrys (country i) and a spoke countrys (country j) prot functions for
exports to country z (another spoke country), denoted by iz and jz respectively, can be written
as:
iz = pz(xz)xiz, z 6= i (1)
jz = [pz(xz)  c  tz]xjz, z 6= i and z 6= j (2)
Similarly, a spoke countrys export prot function in the hub country can be written as:
ji = [pi(xi)  c]xji (3)
7 It is immediate under global free trade that the two stage game is reduced to a one stage game and the tari¤s
we use in the below discussion disappear.
8 It is important to note from the literature on trade policy under imperfect competition that results are highly
sensitive to the choice and functional form of policy instruments. For example, as shown by Brander and Spencer
(1984), and further discussed by Jørgensen and Schröder (2005), whether the policy is ad-valorem or specic could
matter even for the sign of welfare improving intervention.
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First order conditions (FOCs) for prot maximization for exporters are
pz + p
0
zxiz = 0, pz + p
0
zxjz = c+ tz, and pi + p
0
ixji = c, z 6= i; j (4)
The above FOCs together with an analogous condition for the local rms determine the equilibrium
output levels of all rms. Summing the FOCs for all rms in country i gives
npi + p
0
ixi = (n  1)c and npz + p0zxz = (n  1)c+ (n  2)tz, z 6= i (5)
Using the second order conditions (S.O.Cs) of prot maximization problems and the strategic
substitutability, we can derive:9
@xjz
@tz
< 0;
@xiz
@tz
> 0 and
@xzz
@tz
> 0, z 6= i; j
In other words, an increase in tz lowers a spoke country js exports to another spoke county z (xjz)
while it increases the sales of the hub rm (xiz) and that of the local sales denoted by xzz.Welfare
of a spoke country z can be written as the sum of its domestic surplus sz(tz) (sum of consumer
surplus, tari¤ revenue, and the domestic rms local prots) and total export prots:
wz(t)  u(xz)  pzxz +
X
j 6=z;i
tzxjz + zz| {z }
sz(tz)
+ zi +
X
k 6=i;z
zk(tk) (6)
while the welfare of the hub country is the sum of consumer surplus, domestic rms local prots
and total export prots:
wi(t)  u(xi)  pixi + ii| {z }
si
+
X
k 6=i
ik(tk) (7)
Finally, world welfare under hfihgi is dened as:
ww(t) =
nX
k=1
wk(t) (8)
Welfare maximization problem of a spoke country (say country z) is as follows:
tf = argmax wz(0; tz), z 6= i (9)
so that
@wz(0; tz)
@tz

tz=tf
= 0, z 6= i (10)
Next, we show a new interesting possibility that arises under oligopoly model of trade with asym-
metric cost: the hub and spoke trading regime hfihgi can yield higher world welfare than global free
9 If we replace the local startegic substitutability with its global counterpart, then many of the assumptions about
the demand function can be consolidated under this new assumption. See Lahiri and Ono (2004) for further details.
We would like to thank the referee pointing out this possibility.
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trade and the optimum tari¤s spoke countries impose can be optimal from the viewpoint of global
welfare maximization. To this end, consider the impact of spoke countriesexternal tari¤s under
the trade regime hfihgi on world welfare. Using market segmentation and equation (10) we can
write
@ww(t)
@t

t=tf
=
X
z 6=i
@iz(0; tz)
@tz

tz=tf
+
X
j 6=i;z
X
z 6=i;j
@jz(0; tz)
@tz

tz=tf
(11)
In other words, when tari¤s are optimally chosen by spoke countries, a further increase in the
external tari¤s increases world welfare i¤ they increase the total export prots in the world economy.
Note that
@iz(0; tz)
@tz
= p0
@xz
@tz
xiz + p
@xiz
@tz
= p0xiz
X
k 6=i
@kz(0; tz)
@tz
> 0 (12)
i.e. an increase in the tari¤ on its rival exporters increases hub countrys export prots in its export
markets.
Similarly,
@jz(0; tz)
@tz
=
24p0
0@X
k 6=j
@kz(0; tz)
@tz
1A  1
35xjz < 0, j 6= i; z (13)
i.e. an increase in tz lowers its export prots in other spoke countries. Since spoke countries are
completely symmetric, from the hub countrys perspective, a small increase in the tari¤ faced by
one of its exporting rivals is the same as an equivalent increase in the tari¤ faced by the other rival
exporter. Therefore, at tz = tf , the rst order condition for world welfare maximization in (11)
can be written as
1
n  1
@ww()
@

=f
= p0xiz
24X
k 6=i
@kz(0; tz)
@tz
35
tz=tf| {z }

>0
+ xjz
24p0
0@X
k 6=j
@kz(0; tz)
@tz
1A  1
35
tz=tf| {z }
	<0
, j 6= i; z
(14)
which is of ambiguous sign if countries are asymmetric.10 If the rst term in the above expression
(denoted by 
) exceeds the second term (denoted by 	), an increase in tari¤s ine¢ cient spoke
countries impose on each other improves world welfare. Moreover, FTA tari¤s (tf ) under hfihgi
are optimal from the viewpoint of global welfare maximization i¤ 
 = 	.
We next provide an illustration of this result and the related ones using linear demand.
10Under symmetry, it is clear that dww(0;)
d =F
=  (n  1)xij < 0.
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4 A linear demand illustration
Suppose u(xz) = xz   x
2
z
2 so that pz(xz) = 1   xz, where xz =
nX
j=1
xjz. Under a hub and spoke
regime hfihgi, rst order conditions for prot maximization yield the following equilibrium output
levels in the hub country (country i) and spoke countries:
xii(ih) =
1 + (n  1)c
n+ 1
and xzi(ih) =
1  2c
n+ 1
, z 6= i: (15)
and
xiz(ih) =
1 + (n  1)c+ (n  2)tz
n+ 1
;xzz(ih) =
1  2c+ (n  2)tz
n+ 1
;xjz(ih) =
1  2c  3tz
n+ 1
, z 6= i and j 6= i; z
(16)
Given these output levels, equilibrium prices are immediate:
pi(ih) =
1 + (n  1)c
n+ 1
and pz(ih) =
1 + (n  1)c+ (n  2)tz
n+ 1
, z 6= i (17)
Next, we nd the welfare of the hub and spoke countries and the aggregate world welfare as follows:
wi(ih) =
1
2

n  (n  1)c
n+ 1
2
| {z }
CSi(ih)
+

1 + (n  1)c
n+ 1
2
| {z }
ii(ih)
+ (n  1)

1 + (n  1)c+ (n  2)tz
n+ 1
2
| {z }
nX
z 6=i
iz(ih)
(18)
wz(ih) =
1
2

n  (n  1)c  (n  2)tz
n+ 1
2
| {z }
CSz(ih)
+

1  2c
n+ 1
2
| {z }
zi(ih)
+

1  2c+ (n  2)tz
n+ 1
2
| {z }
zz(ih)
(19)
+ (n  2)

1  2c  3tz
n+ 1
2
| {z }
nX
z 6=i;j
jz(ih)
+ (
n  2
n+ 1
)tz(1  2c  3tz)| {z }
TRz(ih)
ww(ih) = wi(ih) + (n  1)wz(ih) (20)
Then, the following tari¤ maximizes each spoke countrys welfare:
tf =
1
(n+ 4)
  (n+ 7)c
3(n+ 4)
(21)
Note that as c rises, the spoke countries become less e¢ cient, becoming a less important rent
extraction source and the optimum tari¤s they impose on each other fall. From hereon, in order to
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guarantee non-negative tari¤ rates and the market access of spoke rms in their export markets,
we assume that c < c = 3n+7 holds.
Do the individual countries benet from a hub and spoke trade agreement relative to free trade?
To address this question, we rst argue below that a hub and spoke trade agreement hfihgi makes
the hub country better o¤ and the spoke countries worse o¤ relative to global free trade. To see
why, rst note that starting at free trade, if spoke countries were to switch to independent bilateral
FTAs with only country i, export prots of the hub country would increase in all its export markets
because in each of its export markets, country is rival exporters would face the tari¤ tf whereas it
itself would not. Furthermore, the domestic surplus of country i under hfihgi is the same as that
under free trade since it has a bilateral FTA with all of its trading partners: si(ih) = 0. As a
result, country is welfare under hfihgi is necessarily higher than that under free trade:
wi(ih)  i(ih) = (n  1)(n  2)[3  c(n+ 7)][9(n+ 2) + c(5n
2 + 13n  10)]
[3(n+ 1)(n+ 4)]2
> 0 (22)
The ip side of this result is that the spoke countries are worse o¤ under hfihgi relative to
global free trade:
wz(ih) =  (n  2)[3  c(n+ 7)][9(n+ 3) + c(n
2   7n  26)]
6[(n+ 1)(n+ 4)]2
< 0 (23)
This result provides a conrmation for the argument that the hub country benets at the expense of
the spoke countries. These welfare results are important because most countries belong to multiple
FTAs and focusing only on a bilateral FTA is unlikely to yield a complete picture regarding their
welfare e¤ects. These results also shed light on how the formation of independent FTAs a¤ects
incentives for multilateral trade liberalization. Since spoke countrieswelfare under hfihgi is lower
than that under free trade, they would surely gain from a move to global free trade.
Next, we compare the world welfare under the hub and spoke regime hfihgi and free trade
hfFgi and nd that the hub and spoke regime yields higher global welfare relative to free trade
when spoke countries are su¢ ciently high cost:
ww(ih) = ww(ih)  ww(F )  0 i¤ c  c = 9(n+ 2)
7n2 + 47n+ 58
(24)
Note that the above possibility is more likely to arise as the number of spoke countries rises: @c@n < 0.
Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c plot ww(ih) as a function of c for three distinct numbers of spoke countries.
 Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c here 
We also nd under hfihgi that there exists a positive world welfare maximizing tari¤ level (tw)
that spoke countries impose on each other when spoke countries are su¢ ciently high cost:
tw =
(n+ 3)c  1
(n  2) (25)
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More interestingly, at t = tf , the rst order condition for world welfare maximization in (14) can
be rewritten as
@ww(t)
@t

t=tf
 0 i¤ xiz  3xjz, where z 6= i and j 6= i; z (26)
so that, under linear demand, FTA tari¤s under hfihgi are optimal from the viewpoint of global
welfare maximization i¤ the hub countrys export in a spoke country is exactly three times more
than that of another spoke country: xik = 3xjk, where z 6= i and j 6= i; z:
w    f  0 i¤ c  c = 3
2n+ 11
(27)
Figures 2a, 2b and 2c compare  f under hfihgi with w under hfihgi for three distinct number of
spoke countries. The intersection of the two lines shows that under hfihgi the external tari¤ of
each spoke can indeed equal its globally optimal value. And when such is the case, the hub and
spoke regime hfihgi yields higher welfare than global free trade.
 Figures 2a, 2b and 2c here 
The following proposition summarizes our ndings regarding the individual and world welfare
e¤ects of hub and spoke trade regime hfihgi relative to free trade hfFgi under linear demand:
Proposition: Suppose c  cz = c  ci = 0; where z 6= i and demand is linear. Then, the
following obtains: (i) the hub country is better o¤ under the hub and spoke trade regime hfihgi
relative to free trade whereas the spoke countries are worse o¤ relative to free trade; (ii) the hub
and spoke trading regime hfihgi yield higher world welfare than global free trade when c  c, where
@c
@n < 0 and (ii) optimum FTA tari¤s under hfihgi are also optimal from the viewpoint of global
welfare maximization: w =  f if and only if c =

c.
Given that the intuition and the implications of the rst part of the above proposition was
explained before, we next focus on the intuition behind the last two parts of the proposition. The
rst point to note for these striking results is that the assumption that rms compete in quantities
plays a crucial role in delivering these results. As is well known, under quantity competition rms
with di¤erent production costs can remain active in production so long as demand is big enough.
From a world welfare perspective, the external tari¤s under hfihgi have two conicting e¤ects on
world welfare. On the one hand, such tari¤s tend to lower world welfare relative to free trade
since they adversely a¤ect the exports of spoke countries. On the other hand, FTA tari¤s shift
production in favor of the low cost country i and this improves allocative e¢ ciency. What the
above proposition argues and Figures 1 and 2 conrm is that it is quite possible for the latter e¤ect
to dominate the former. It is immediate from gure 2 that  f is decreasing in c while the opposite
is true for w. The intuition is as follows: as c rises, spoke countriesincentives to impose tari¤s on
each other decreases since they become less important sources of rent-extraction and thus  f falls.
9
On the other hand, w maximizes world welfare and thus internalizes allocative e¢ ciency e¤ect
leading to higher tari¤s as c rises.
Here, it is important to note that FTA between the spoke countries always increases their
welfare. Although the hub country su¤ers from the spoke-spoke FTA, it can not directly prevent
the spoke-spoke FTA and thus the realization of global free trade. Hence, even if a hub and spoke
trade system realizes higher world welfare, the system is not stable and the equilibrium outcome
would be global free trade if we consider endogenous formation of FTAs. Taking the sustainability
problem into account, the policy implications of this result needs further attention. This result
may suggest that international transfers from the hub country to the spoke countries are useful to
prevent the spoke-spoke FTA and improve world welfare. The result also indicates that, even if
global free trade is realized in the long run, a temporary formation of a hub and spoke trade system
may lead to an interim improvement of world welfare.
5 Concluding remarks
One of the striking features of todays global policy landscape is the widespread prevalence of PTAs.
Most of the countries simultaneously participate in several such agreements leading to several hub-
and-spoke trading systems. In this paper we aim at shedding light on the welfare implications of
hub and spoke trade regimes relative to free trade. We show that, under an oligopoly model of trade
with asymmetric costs, a hub and spoke trading arrangement increases the e¢ cient hub countrys
welfare even beyond what it can obtain under global free trade while making ine¢ cient spokes worse
o¤. Second, such an arrangement can be welfare-preferred to global free trade if the hub country
is su¢ ciently low cost compared to the spoke countries since the trade diversion inherent to such a
regime enhances the e¢ ciency of global production. It is important to note that since a CU member
cannot form an additional PTA with non-members without a consent of the other member, such
an outcome is never possible under a customs union. The major results of the paper obtain in a
framework where independent FTAs in the form of a hub and spoke regime are exogenously given.
In order to obtain more complete picture, one should endogenize trade agreement formation. We
intend to pursue this research in near future.
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